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Abstract 
If we want of group of autollomOllS agl'nt.s t.o act and to cooperate in a world, 
each of them needs knowledge ahout this world, abont. t.he knowledge of ot.her 
agents, and about his own knowledge. To descrihe such knowledge we introduce 
the language ALex: which extends the concept language Ate hy a new operat.or 
D i. Thereby, D i<P is to be read as "agent i knows r.p". This knowledge operator 
is interpreted in terms of possihle worlds. That means, besides the reaJ world, 
agents can imagine a number of other worlds to be possible. An agent is then 
said to know a fact <p if <p is true in all worlds he considers possible . 
In th is paper we use an axiomat.ization of the knowledge operator which has 
been proposed by Moore . Therehy, knuwledge of agent.s is int.erpreted such that 
(i) agents are able to reason on the basis of t.heir knowledge, (ii) anyt.hing that is 
known by an agent is true, and ('iii) if all agent knows sOlllething then he knows 
that he knows it. We will give tablcallX-brtsed algor it.hllls for deciding whether a 
set of ALex: sentences is satisflahle, ,wd whether sneh a. set ent.ails a given Atex: 
sentence. 
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1 Introduction 
Most artificial intelligence (A I) research investigates how a single system can exhibit 
intelligent behaviour. However, the recognition that much huma.n problem solving 
involves groups of people and the development of concurrent computers provoked in-
terest in concurrency and distribution in AI ([BG88]). Thus, research on the field of 
distributed AI deals with the question how a group of autol101110US intelligent systems, 
often called agents, can cooperate to solve complex problems (see, e.g., [Huh87, BG88, 
GH89]). Thereby, the representation and use of knowledge is one of the most important 
foundations. Hence, if we want a group of autonomous agents to act and to cooper-
ate in a world we have to equip them with a knowledge representation and reasoning 
component. Within this component the agents' knowledge about the world, about 
knowledge of other agent s, and about their own knowledge shou ld be represented. 
Since the work of Hintikka [Hin62]' modal logics have been widely accepted to be an 
adequate formalism for representing knowledge of an agent. The intuitive idea here is 
that besides the real world, agents can ima.gine a nurnber of other worlds to be possible. 
An agent is then said to know a fact c.p if c.p is true in all worlds he thinks possible. 
For example, an agent knows that there is a monster of Loch Ness if there is such a 
monster in all worlds he considers possible. In order to express the knowledge of an 
agent a, in this approach a binary operator !-:NOW (a, c.p) is used, where c.p is a formula 
over some logical language L. Now, if we want to devise a formalism for representing 
knowledge of agents we have to take two decisions. firstly, we have to choose a certain 
logical representation language 1: to describe the knowledge of agents. Secondly, we 
have to decide what the genera l properties of knowledge are we want this forrnalism to 
capture. That means, we have to give an axiomatiza.tioll of the !\-NOHI operator. 
When investigating multi-agent appli cat ions to model shipping departments and 
loading docks, we had to equip agents with knowledge about, e .g., trucks and goods. 
For the representation of such kind of knowledge about a world, terminological logics 
provide a structured and adequate formalism. Thus, we will use them as representation 
language L to describe our agents' world knowledge. Terminologica.llogics are based 
on the work of Brachman and Schmolze [BS85] and call be used to define the relevant 
concepts of a particular problem domain. Starting with atomic concepts (unary pred-
icates) and roles (binary predicates), one thereby defines complex concepts with the 
help of operators provided by a so-called concept language. In addit.ion, objects can be 
associated with concepts while relationships between objects call be defined via roles. 
Terminological logics provide a well-investigated and decidable subclass of first-
order logics and can, e .g. , be used to represent facts like "each truck is a vehicle" or 
"John owns a vehicle which is a truck". However, they do not provide an adequate 
formalism to represent what agents kllow about the knowledge of other agents and, es-
pecially, about their own knowledge. Additionally, term inological logics do not provide 
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a formalism for representing ,In axiolllC1ti;t,ClI,ion of t.lw repn'sC"lItf'd knowledge as, e.g., 
if an agent knows r..p, then he knows thaI, 11<' kllows Y' ("posit.ive introspection"). In this 
paper we will introduce a formalism which overcomes boUI problems while maintaining 
the adequate representation of the agents' world knowledge. 
In the past, a lot of different axiomatizations of the ]\l\'OW operator have been 
given (see, e.g., [Mo080, Mo085, HalSG, IIl\r~)O, 1\1vdnV~Jla, '[vdTIV91b, I-J1\192]). But 
none of these axiomatizations has bef'n accepted to be the "ultimat.e" logical approach; 
each of them is more adequate in some doma.ins alld less aclC"Cjuate in some ot.hers. So, 
what are the relevant properties of kllowledgf' for agf'nts ill applications like shipping 
departments and loading docks? We kf'l, that the propert.if's of knowledge Moore 
described in his seminal work [MooSO, MooSS] a.re ackql1ate ill tllf's(" applications, since 
he argued these properties to be relevant. to plclll11ing and acting. The first of these 
properties is that anything that is k11o\\,11 by all agellt. lIlUSt. be t.rue. For f'xample, if an 
agent knows that a certain truck can traIls port. gasolilW t.his must. 1)(' t.nlf'. Otlwrwise, 
he must not assign this truck for a gC\.sol i I \C' \.rallspor\.a.t. ion ord( 'r. Secolld Iy, WC" assume 
that, if an agent knows something, t.I}(,1I II(' kllo\\'s t.","II, hc kllo\\'s it.. TIlis prillciplf' is 
needed especially for a.gents to pla.Il11illg. Suppos(' <III (JI!/'Ill. plclllS 1.0 achi('ve a goal and 
therefore needs to knovv whf'tlwr a. ('('r\.ilill I.l'Ilck ('a.1I Ir,,"sport. ge'\.solilw "lid wlJ('tllcr 
John owns this truck. If hf' a.lrea.c1y kIlO\\'S I,ll<' firs\. fClcl to 1)(' t.rll!' a.lld lIas t.o perform 
some action a.ct to find out wlIet.ll(,], t.11<' S('('Ollci fact. is a.lso \.1'11(', 1.11<'11 he Il('eds to know 
whether he still knows that thf' I.rllck CellI I.rClllsporl. gClsolill(' af\,er performillg a.ct. 
Finally, the most importan t fact. about, kilo\\, ledg(' \\'(' \\''',111, t,o UIVt.lIr(' is, of cou rsf', 
that agents can reason on the basis of t.Iwir kllo\\'l('cig('. For ('x<lIl1plf', ::;uppose agf'nt 
a knows that each gasoline truck call t.r(Jllsport. gilsolill(' Cl.1lc1 lIe kllows .)01111 to own 
truck-l which is a gasoline truck. III this ("CIS!', ilg('II1. (/ sll(J11Ic1 1)(' able to conclude that 
John's truck truck-l can be u::;ecl to Lrc1.llsport. gelsolill(', illHI t.hus ImlY lI('got.ia.te with 
John for a gasoline transportatioll ol'd('r. 
Now we have decided which l'epreS('llt,at.ioll ""l1gll(lg(~ t.0 IIS(' for t.1l<' knowledge of 
agents, and what the relevant properties of kllo\\"lcclge C\n~. BId, "ow call we bring both 
things together, and how can we 0\'('ITOI1W t.1J(' (I,bo\'e 11l<'lItiolled pl'oblclllS which appea.r 
when using terminological logics CIS r('I)J"('S('l1t,C\,t.ioll lallgllclge £? 
In this paper we will pre::;ent t.he ICllIgll<lgc' A£C,,· wllie" extends !.lIe concept language 
A£C by a new operator Di for each "geld i. Th('::;(J lIe\\' op('J"cll,ors ,Ire intf'rpreted in 
terms of possible worlds and Di'P repr('senl.s 1,lle f(l,cl. '"agellt. i k\lows r..p". The extended 
language A£C,(; provides an adequat.e fOl'lll<disl11 for 1)()t.\I, to rCJ>I'(,S(~IJt, tlw agents' world 
knowledge and to represent what agellts kllo\\' aboul. t.\J(' kllo\\'kdgc of other agents and 
about their own knowledge. For f'xCJ.mp"', I."e fCl,cl. "age'lI1. a kllow::; t.hat agent" does 
not know r..p" is represented by DIl,DbY'. FUl'tlwl'IllOl'<!, t.lle kllowledge operator can 
be interpreted w.r.t.. a given axiol11al.izal.ioll CIS, e.g., posit.iv(-' intro::;pection. ' Vve will 
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show that the resulting modal logic is decidable when using Moore's axiomatization of 
knowledge. 
In Section 2 we will formally introduce syntax and semantics of the concept lan-
guage A£C and of its extension A£C}C. Of course, we are not only interested in the 
representation)of knowledge by a set of A£C}C-axioms, but we want to test the repre-
sented knowledge on satisfiabi lity and are interested in C0I11puting logical consequences . 
Thus, in Sections 3 and 4 we will present an algorithm for deciding whether a given 
set of A£C}C-axioms is satisfiable. Finally, in Section 5, we will show how to decide 
whether an A£C}C-axiom is a logical consequence of a set of given A£C}C-axioms. 
2 Syntax and Semantics of A£CK 
In this section we will formally introduce the language A.cCK which extends the concept 
language A£C by a new operator Di for each agent i. Thereby, Di<P can be read as 
"agent i knows <p". Syntax and semantics of A.cC and A.cCK, are given in Subsections 
2.1 and 2.2, respectively. 
2.1 The Concept Language ALe 
Terminological logics provide two formalisms to describe a problem domain: a termino-
logical formalism to represent taxonomical knowledge by defining concepts, which can 
be seen as sets of objects, and an assertional formalism which can be used to describe 
concrete objects. Therefore, one starts with a. set. of (dom.ic concepts (unary predicates) 
and a set of roles (binary predicates). 
In the concept language A.cC concepts a.re built up from atomic concepts, the top 
concept T, the bottom concept 1-, and roles inductively by: 
1. Each atomic concept, T, and 1- are concept.s. 
2. If C and D are concepts and R is a role, t.hen 
( a) enD (concept conjunction), 
(b) CuD (concept disjunction), 
(c) -,C (concept negat£on), 
(d) V R..C (value 1'esi1'ictio'n) , and 
( e) ::J R.. C (exists resh'iction) 
are concepts. 
5 
An interpretation I is a function o\,f'r SOIllf' 1l0n-f'mpt.y domain ~I which maps f'ach 
atomic concept C to a subset Cl of ~ I, pach rolf' R to a. su bspt. RI of ~ I x ~ I, T to 
t:~J, and -L to 0. Furthermore, n is interprC'ted as set int.ersection, U as set union, and 
-, as set complement \V.r.t. ~I. The value and the exists rest.rictions are intf'rpreted by 
[V R..GV = {d E ~I 1 Vd' : (d,d') E RI --+ d' E (,'/} 
[::3R.GV = {d E ~I 1 ::3d' : (d,d') E R J 1\ d' Eel} 
For example, if man and truck are atomic cOllcepts alld OW/lS is a role wp can define 
the concept of men who own a t.ruck by lWI.1l n ::3 OII·/l ..... I.mck. 
The taxonomical knowledge of a probicill dOll1ain can be ddinf'd by an ALC- TBo:r. 
(terminology), which consists of a. finitf' Sf't. of terminological a.xiollls. A lermin.ological 
axiom is of the form 
• C = D (concept equivalencf') or 
• C # D (negated concept equivaif'IIC<') 
where C, D are concepts. An illtf'rprf't.at.ioll J sat.isfi('s (.' = f) iff" (.', = D' and it 
satisfies C # D iff (,'1 # DI. All in1<'rpr('t.a.t.ioll I silt.isfi('s Clil ALC-TBox Tiff J 
satisfies each axiom in T. For example , if cil1Tier, 1J('r .... Oll , allc! I,mrk a.re cOllcepts and 
owns is a role, we can define exactly t.ile persolls \\"110 0\\"11 a truck 1.0 he il carrier by 
GllTier = per .... Oll n ::3 oll·/l ..... I.mel,. 
The assertiona.l formalism of ALC ,diems to illt.roduc(' COIICITt.e object.s by st.a.t.ing 
that they are instances of concept.s alld rol('s: If (/. is all ol)j('c\. alld (.' a. (,OIIC('pt, titf'1I 
a : C is a concept insi.a.nC(;. If a (I.lld II ill'(' obj('ct.s illlc! 11 is a 1'01(', L1l<'11 aRh is a 
role instance. Concept inst.ances Cllld role illst.illlCC'S ar(' call('d rtss(T/'ional rt:riom.s, and 
a finite set of assertional axioms is cCl,11n1 ,III ALC- /IIJo,l'. :\11 illt.('rprd.at.ioll I maps 
objects to elements of its domaill ~, illld satisfies 0 : ( .' iff" oJ E (:1, and aRh iff 
(r/,b I ) E RI. We assume that dift'ercnt ohi( ~ ct.s ill an ABox a.re 1l1<1.pped to difrf'rent 
elements in ~ I (1mi'ltle name a.s871.'IIIplion). An illt.(~ rpl'('\.ati()ll I sat.isfies a.ll ALC-A13ox 
A iff I satisfies each axiom in A. As all eXilmplE', if .]0/111 ami 1,I'/I(;/.;- J Mf' objects, Wf' 
can express that John owns truck-l which is a truck by tlw assertiollal axioms 
John owns truck-l and truck-J : truck. 
Thus, we can describe the relevant cOllcepts of a prOI)i<-1ll domaill by terminological 
axioms, i.e., by an A.cC-TBox, a.ncl propert.ies of objects a.s well as relations betw~~n 
them by assertional axioms, i.e., by all ALC-A Box. We say all illt.erpretation I sat.isfies 
a set AXl, ... ) AXn of terminological and ilssertional axiollls iff I satisfi es each of these 
axioms. We then write I 1= AXl , ... , Ax1/' 
For sake of simplicity we will somet.illles lise til(' expressions C ~ D and C g D 
where C and D are concepts. An interpretation 1 sat.isfies C ~ D iff (:1 ~ DI ana 
it satisfies C g D iff C J C; DI. The next. lemma staks tlwt these expressions are 
abbreviations for certain terminological axioms. 
Lemma 2.1 Let C and D be conapls, (lndlel 1 l)(; (1./1. in I rrl'rclrt/ion. Then 
1. 1 satisfies C ~ D iff 1 s(i.lis.fi:r:s -,C u D = T. 
2. I satisfies C g D 1fT I sat.is./i:(:s -,(: U D of T. 
Proof: For 1., firstly suppose I satisfies c: ~ D. Theil for ('(lcI! clement d in ~ 1 either 
d E [-,CF or both d E C I and dEDI holds. Tlla\. llleallS , I sa\.isfies -,(,' U (C n D) = T 
what can be simplified to -,C U D = T. COII\'crsely, SuPPOS(~ J sat.isfies -,C: U D = T. 
Then for each element d E ~ 1 e itl)('r d tf- ('lor d ED I Iiolds. Thus, from d E c: J 
follows dEDI, i.e., C 1 ~ DI. T he proor or 2. is allillogolls. ° 
For example, if truck alld vehicle i!re (,OII(,CPt.S \\'(' Cilll ddill(' each t.ruck \.0 Iw a 
vehicle by truck ~ vehicle, what is all abbreviat.ioll ror -,I,rllck U vehicle = T. 
2.2 The Extended Language ALe,,: 
Now we will introduce the language ALC .... wllicll ('X\('II<iS ALC L>y fI lIew op('rator 0 i 
for each agent i.I Vie allow these op(']"ators in froll\. or \cl'Illiliological alld assertional 
axioms. Thereby, the operator 0" r<·~a.d as ··a.g('llt i kIIO\vs ", allows us t.o express the 
knowledge agent i has about t he world , il,bout kllowl('dge or otlwr iI,gellts, and about 
his own knowledge. V'le extend tile ddinit.ioll of terilliliological <l.lld assertiollal axioms 
as follows. 
• If TA is a terminological axiom, thell 0i TA alld -,0iTA are terminologica.l axioms 
as well. 
• If CI is a concept inst.ance, t.hen 0 i CI a.nd -,0i Cl are con('(~pt instances as well. 
• If R.I is a role instance, thell 0 ; JU is it role illstall(,(-~ itS well. 
These extended assertiona.1 alld terlllillologica.1 (tXiOlllS a.re called A£CK -({ .. 7:ioms and 
can, e.g., be used to sta.te tha.t agellt i bluws that each \.l'llck is iI. vehicle by 
Di (truck ~ vehicle). 
lIn the following, we will abbreviate agpnt.s hy IlIlrnbe rs, a.nd we suppose only a finite number of 
agents to be given. 
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Analogously, the A£C,IC-axioms oj-,oj (vehicle-l : truck) and oj-,oj (vehicle-l : truck) 
are to be read as "agent i knows that agent j doesn't know that vehicle-l is a truck" 
and "agent i knows that he doesn't know truck-l to be a truck", respectively. It is not 
reasonable to allow oi immediately in front of concepts, since the fact "agent i knows 
C" makes not much sense if C is a concept. 
We will interpret the operators oi in terms of possible worlds, i.e., besides the real 
world there exist a number of worlds agents consider to be possible. If agent i considers 
world w' possible at world w, we say w' is accessible f1'om 'W by agent i. The accessibility 
relation of agent i is given by all pairs (10,10') sll ch that 10' is access ible from w by agent 
i, Since different worlds are possible in our approach, the interpretation of concepts 
and roles in A£Ccaxioms depends on the world we are currently speaking of. That 
means, in different worlds concepts may contain different objects and roles may contain 
different pairs of objects. This will be expressed by taking an add itional parameter, the 
world parameter, into consideration whell interpreting cOllcepts and roles. Formally, 
we use the notion of a 1( -interpretation f{[ which consists of a non-empty domain fl.["! 
and maps objects to elements in fl.[\I , atomic concepts to subsets of fl.!"! x W, T to 
6.f(! X W, ~ to 0 X W, and roles to subsets of 6./"1 x 6/\'1 X W. Furthermore, n is 
interpreted as set intersection, U as set union, and -, as set complement W.r.t. fl.K1 x W, 
and the value and exists restrictions are interpreted by 
[VR.Clf(! = {(d,w) 1 (d',w) E C K1 for each d' with (d,d',w) E R!\'I} 
[::3R.Clf(/ = {(d,w) 1 (d',w) E CJ\/ for some d' with (d,d',w) E R!\/}. 
Definition 2.2 A J{ripke sf1'uctw'e f{ is a f'riple (W, r, J\' d. Thereby, W is a non-
empty set of worlds, r is a finite set of accessibility relations, one accessibility 1'elation 
Ii for each agent i , and 1(! is a J{ -inie'rprc/.rdion. 
J:he satisfiability of an A£C,IC-axiom F in a J('ripl.:e st1'71,ci1lre J{ 
world w E W, written as 1(, W F F, is recursively defin<:>d by: 
(W, r'!{J) and a 
1(,w 1= C = D iff 
]{,w F C =I- D iff 
]{,w Fa: C iff 
]{, W 1= aRb iff 
1(,w 1= DiG iff 
]{, W 1= -,ojG iff 
{d 1 (d, w) E C /\' I} = {d 1 (d, Hi) E D [\' 1 } 
{d 1 (d, HI) E C [\' I} =I- {d 1 (d , w) E D K I } 
(a, 10) E C [(I 
(a, b, w) E R/\'I 
f{,w' 1= G for each world 'tu' with (w,w') E,i 
there is a world w' with (Hi, w') E Ii and J{,w' l1= G 
where G is an A£C,IC-axiom, C, D are concepts, a, h are objects, and R is a role. 
A set Fl, . .. ,Fn of A£C,IC-axioms is satisfiable iff there exists a Kripke structure 
]{ = (W, r,]{/) and a world Wo E W such that f{, Hio 1= Fi for i = 1, ... , n. We then 
write]{ F Fl ,···, Fn· 
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Note, that we do not allow axioms of the form -,0i(aRb). The reason for this 
restriction is that such axioms would be equivalent to stating that there exists a world 
in which the role instance aRb does not hold. And it is not yet clear how to treat 
negation of roles in terminological logics. 
In the fallowing we will use the notion modality to denote (negated) indexed ° 
operators, and ALCK-axioms without any modalities are called ALC-axioms. For ex-
ample, the ALCK-axiom 0 i-,O.i(vehicle-l : truck) contains the modalities 0 i and -,0j , 
and the ALCK-axiom vehicle-l : truck is an ALC-axiom. 
3 Testing Satisfiability of A£CK-axioms 
Using ALCK-axioms, a "real world" and knowledge of agents can be defined as follows. 
The real world is given by a finite set of A.CC-axioms, and the knowledge of agent i is 
given by a finite set of A£CK-axioms with the leading operator 0i. Of course, we do 
not only want to represent a world and knowledge of agents, but we are interested in 
algorithms to test (i) consistency of the represented facts, i.e ., whether a given set of 
ALCK-axioms is satisfiable, and (ii) whetIter an A£CK-axiom is a logical consequence 
of a given set of A£CK-axioms. In this section we will give an algorithm for testing 
satisfiability of a set of ALCK-axioms. Building upon this we will show how to decide 
whether of not an ALCK-axiom is a logi ca.l consequence from a set of A£CK-axioms in 
Section 5. 
3.1 The Frame Algorithm 
We will now present an algorithm for testing satisfiability of a set F1 , . . . , Fn of ALCK -
axioms. To keep notation simple we use 0 i F as an abbreviation for -'0i-,F , and 
transform A£CK-axioms into negation normal form. An A£CK-axiom (concept) is in 
negation normal form iff in the axiom (concept) negation signs occur immediately in 
front of atomic concepts only. Concepts can be transformed into an equivalent. negation 
normal form by the rules 
-,(C n D) -t -,C u-,D -,(\1 R.C) -t "3 R.-,C 
-,(C U D) -t -,C n-,D -,(:JR.C) -t \lR.-,C 
where C is a concept and R is a role (see, e.g., [Hol~)O]). Building upon this it is easy to 
verify that A£Ccaxioms can be transformed into an equivalent negation normal form 
by the rules 
-. -. F ----+ F -.oiF ----+ Oi-.F -.( C = D) ----+ C* =1= D* 
-.OiF ----+ oi-.F -.( C =1= D) ----+ C* = D* 
-.(a : C) ----+ a: [-.C]* 
where F is an A£Cx:;-axiom, C, D are concepts, (L is an object, and C*, D*, and 
[-.C]* are the negation normal forms of the concepts C, D, and -.C, respectively. For 
example, the negation normal form of the A£Cx:;-axiom 
IS 
In the following we suppose each A£Cx:;-axiom to be given in IIegation normal form. 
It is easy to verify that the negation normal forms of th0. abbr('viations C C D and 
C (l D are given by C* (l D* and C* ~ D*, respectively. 
By definition, a set F1 , . .. , Fn of A£CK-axioms is sat.isfiable iff tlwre exists a Kripke 
structure J( such that J( 1= F1 , ... , FI/,' Of course, we are no(. int.f'r('st.ed in arbitrary 
Kripke structures to satisfy FI"'" F", but. only in I\ripke st.rllctures which interpret 
the knowledge operators oi in the sense of l\'Joore, i.e., which sat.isfiy t.hf' t.hree proper-
ties of the knowledge operator which ha\'0. been int.roduced in S('ct.ion 1. Wf' t.lwrf'fore 
introduce the notion of 84 Kripke structures. 
D efinition 3. 1 A set F1 , . . . , F" of A[CK -fl.7:ioms is .s'fl-sal is./irthlr' 'i:IT I hf:H' (;:risis a 
](7'ipke structure J( = (W, r , 1\ f) which srtt.is./ies F 1 , .•. , F'" and has I.he following p'/'op-
edies: 
( P 1 ) if !{, w ~ 0, F t !Wl/. !\', W 1= F 
(P2) if 1\, Hi ~ oiF l!u;n !\, w 1= oioj F 
for each A £CK.-axiom F, for each agni.l i, and for roeh wo/'ld w E W . A J\'ripkf: 
structure which satisfies (Pl) and (P2) is ("alltd 84 I\ripke structme. 
Property (PI) corresponds to "anything that is known by an agellt must be true" 
and (P2) to "if an agent knows somethillg, then he knows t.ha.t he knows it". The 
third property, "agents must be able to rf'ason 011 t.he basis of their knowledge", is 
guaranteed by choosing Kripke structur(~S for the representation of knowledge (for 
details, see [MooSO]) . 
It is a well-known fact that 1\ is an 84 f\ripke structure if the accessibility relation 
Ii of each agent i is reflexive and transitive (see, e.g., [CheSO, IICG8]). 
To formulate a calculus for the franlf' algorithm we introduce t.ile notions of labelled 
A£CK-axioms and of a world constraint system. A labelled A£CK.:-axiom consists of an 
A£CK.-axiom F together wit.h a label tv, written as F II Hi. Thereby, w is a constant 
which represents a world in which F holds. A world constnl.1:nl. is either a labelled 
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1. W -+0 {F II w} U W 
if DjF II w is in ltV, and F II w is not. in W. 
2. W -+0 {w txl j v, F II V, Gl 1111, DiG\ 1111, ... ,G'1 II 1', oJ;,, II u} U IV 
if OjFl ltv is in HI , there is no labC'lll) in IV such t.hat. OiFl1 w is cO\'('red 
by tt), DiGl II w, ... , 0/;11 II 'tV arC' ('xact,ly t.\w world const.raints ill W 
of the form DiG II w, and u is a 11C'W lab('\. 
3. VV -+0 {w txl i v} U IV 
if OiF II tv is in IV, OJ' Ill/! is co\'ercc\ by lal)('1 v ill W, and for each 
label 1V in VV such that Oi F is CO\'('I"(,e1 by II ) , W txl, 11) is 110t in IV. 
Figure 1: Propagat.ioll rllks of til<' 1'1',1111<' algorit.illll. 
A£CK;-axiom or a term w txl i Wi. Tllc const.allt.s lIJ (111<1 Wi {'('PI'<'S(,IIt. worlds (l,nd txl i 
represents the accessibilit.y rf' laL ioll of ag(,lIt. i. i\ lI'orLrI ('oll,,/f'{Jill/ ".')8/(' /11. is a rinit(~, 
non-empty set of world constrai11ts. 
A Kripke structure k satisfies a world const.raillt. syst,(,11l IV iff" for ca.ch label w in 
W there is a world wI\" E W sti c h t.hed, (i) /\' , It/" 1= F for ('e!.ch worlel constraint F II HI 
in Wand (ii) (wI", vI") E Ii fo r f'ach world COllst.rclillt. w txl, II ill I V. i\ world const.raint 
system W is (84- )saUsfiabh; iff t1lcrf' ('xists ,\II (SII) I\ripke st,ructllrc which sat.isfies W. 
For testing 84-satisfiability of a sct. F I , ... , I ';, of A£CA-axioills, w(' first.ly t.ranslate 
them into a world constraint SySt.f' lll. The world ('ollst.raillt. syst,C'1l1 IV is 'inr!ur;r;r! by 
Fl , ... , Fn iff W = {F1 111Ou, .. :, F" II WlI}, \\,11<'1'(' 'IIJ() is it IIC'\\' (,OIlSt.illlt (wllich repr('sents 
the real world). Obviously, F1 , . .. , I~, i\I'(' 's' :I-sat.isfial)lc' iff' \,V is ,S' /I-sat.isfiablc' . 
For testing S4-satisfiability of a worlel COllstraillt. systc'lll W wc' will usc' t.Iw t.hJ'('~e 
propagation rules which a.rf' given ill Figlll'c 1 allel \\' llicll sll('c('ssiv(~ly add nf'W world 
constraints to W. The main idea, l)('hill<l til<'S(, ruks is as follows. Firstly, we add as 
much information about Wo to HI a.s possil)I('. TII;:d, IIlC'cUIS , if t.Iwre is a world const.raint 
DjF II Wo in W we extend the world cOlIst.raillt sySt.c'11l W by F II Wu. TJI(,Il, if tllf're 
is a labelled A£C,IC-axiom Oi F Ilwu ill IV, WC' "juIl1P"t.o a IJ(-'W label , say w, while 
inheriting as much informat.ion a.s possilJle frOlll Wu t.o w. For c'xcl.ll1ple, if DiG II 'tVu is a 
world constraint in W , we add G II 'W to W . Now, W b(,col1lc~S the CUITellt Ia.bel and is 
handled as described for 100 abovC'. This process is it.erat.ed ulltil 110 more propaga.tion 
rule is applicable (d., e.g., [Fit83, IIC:G~ , C:or~)2]). 
Let us now have a closer look at the thl'(,c~ propagCltioll I'ules. firstly, if there is a 
labelled A£CK;-axiom DiF II tv in W, t11(,1l C'ClCIt 84 Kripke st.l'uctlll'e f{ which satisfies 
DiF II w also satisfies F II tv (because of property (P j) of 84 I~ripke structures). Thus, 
j 1 
the -to rule adds the world constraint F II w to H! whene\'er there is a world constraint 
DiF" w in Wand F II w is not in W. 
Secondly, suppose the world constraint system HI contains a labelled A.cCK-axiom 
OiF Ilw. If there exists an S4 Kripke structure f{ = (W, r, f{[) which satisfies W, then 
there is a world, say v, in W such that (w/{, v/{) E Ii and ]{, vI\' 1= F. Furthermore, 
for each labelled A.cCK-axiom DiG II w in W holds 
2. K, w K 1= DiDiG because of Property (P2) of 84 Eripke structures, and thus 
K,vK F DiG since (w/{,v/{) E,i· 
Let now OiF II w be a world constraint in 1-11, and let DiG1 II Hi, . .. ,DiGn II w be exact ly 
the world constraints of the form DiG II 'tV in W. TheIL, t ll P -to rule adds the world 
constraints w lXl i v, F II v, G1 II v, DiGl II v, ... , Gn II v, OJ,'" II 11 to Hl , where v is a new 
label. 
Unfortunately, if we use the -to rule as described above it may be applicable to 
a world constraint system W an infinite number of times. Consider, for example, the 
world constraint system W which isgivpII by {F II W, 0 1F II w,D I0 1F II w}. Since 
the A.cCK-axioms 0lF II wand 0IOIF II ware in IV, all application of t.he -to rule 
would introduce a new label v, and extend W by {w 1Xl1 V, F II V, 0 1 F II v, 0 10 1 F II v}. 
In this case we would have "duplicated" our world constraint system, and t.he same 
duplication step could be applied to Od:? II v, and so 011. That means, an infinite 
number of world constraints would be int.roduced into IV. To overcome this problem 
we introduce the notion of a covering. 
Definition 3.2 Given a 'Wodd c01I.sfrfJ.?:nf system, HI and a label v in W, the A.cCK-
axiom OiF II w is covered by label v (1I1 .'/'.t. HI ) UT 1-11 contains the world constraints 
F II v and for each 'World constmint DiG II w in IV il wulff.ins bot.h G II v and DiG II v . 
In the above world constraint system HI = {F II w,OIF II w, D10 1F II w}, the label 
w is covered by itself. Therefore, instead of generat ing <I Ilew world in which F, OIF, 
and D10 1F holds, the world constraint w IXlI til is addpd (.0 HI. 1 his case is handled 
by the -t 0 rule. 
Building upon these three propagation rules we define the frame algorithm which 
is given in Figure 2. It has a world constraint syst.em HI a.s input which is induced by 
a set of A.cCK-axioms to be tested on S4-satisfi abi lity. St.arting with IV it constructs 
a chain W = Wo -t1 WI -t2 ... -tn IVn such that t.here is no more propagation rule 
applicable to Wn and -tiE {-to, -to, -to}. Thereby, tbe -to rule has to be applied 
as often as possible before applying the -to or the -to rule. Output of t.he frame 
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1. Let i := 0 and let Wo be the input world constraint system. 
2. While there is a propagation rule in {-o, -----to, -oJ applicable to TVi do 
(a) if -0 is applicable to lVi then apply -----to to Wi 
else if -----to is applicable to Wi then apply -----to t.o TVi 
else if -----to is applicable t.o TVi then a.pply -----to to TVi . 
(b) i:=i+1. 
3. return Wi. 
Figure 2: TIl(' rrame-' algorit.hlll. 
algorithm is the (extended) world cOllst.raillt. systc\Il IV". Frolll t.bis we can construct 
a frame, i.e., a pair (W, r) consistillg of a scI. or worlels W (-I.ne! a set r of accessibility 
relations /i (one for ea,ch a.gent. i). Tlwrci>y, W COllsists of cdl la,lwls ill HI, and /i IS 
given by the reflexive and transitive closurc of the sd. {( W, (1) I w lXI, 11 is ill IV}. 
Exalnple 3.3 Suppose (/. to be an agellt who knows t.Il c)t each gasoline truck can 
transport gasoline, and that John owns truck-l which is a gasoline> truck. Furthermore, 
suppose that neither agent (/. nor agent h kllows tllat trllck-l cau transport gasoline. 
This can be expressed by the following fivf' A£CK-axioms. 
D (t (ga.soline- tru ck ~ Ciill- tra!jSI)Qrl,-gaso/i lle) 
D(t(John OlVllS truck-J) 
Dn( truck-l : gaso/ille-I,ruck) 
0 ,,( trucl,-J : -,uw-l,fa/J .... port-git .... o/illC) 
Ob( truck-l : -,ca.ll-l,fi-l/l.Sporl,-gil .... o/illC) 
The world constraint system TVo which is illduced by tllCse five A£Ccaxioms is the set 
which consists of the fo llowing world cOllstra.ints 
(1) Da(ga.soline-truck ~ ca.lI-tra.nsport-gilsoline) II Wo 
(2) Du(John 011'118 truck-i) II 10U 
(3) DI/(tl'uck-l : ga.so/ine-truck) II Wo 
(4) Oa( truck-l : -,cilIl-transport,-gaso/ine) II Wo 
(5) Ob( truck-l : -,ciln-tra.lJ..;;port-gilso/ine) II 'Wo 
By applications of the -----to rule to (1), (2), and (:3), respectively we obtain the world 
constraint system WI which extends TVo by 
(6) ga.soline-truck ~ ciw-trilJ1sport-gasoline II Wo 
(7) John OIl'11S truck-lll 'tVo 
(8) truck-l : ga.so/ine-trllck II Wo 
Then, by one application of the --+0 rule to (4), we obtain the world constraint system 
W2 which extends W l by 
) 
Wa 1Xl" WI 
truck-l : -,can- tnmsport-gasoline II WI 
Da(gasoline-truck ~ can-tnwsport-ga.soline) " WI 
gasoline-truck ~ can-tra.nsport-gasoline " WI 
D(L(John owns truck-l) " WI 
John owns truck-l " WI 
Da(truck-l : gasoline-truck) II WI 
truck-l : ga.soline-truck II 'wI 
Now, the labelled A£Cx:;-axiom (5), 
0 b( truck-l : -,ca.n-transport-ga.80line) " 1iJu, 
from (4) 
from (1) 
from (1) 
from (2) 
from (2) 
from (3) 
from (3) 
is covered by WI, such that we obtain 1!V3 = l1V2 U {Hla IXlb 'lj}j} by tlw --+0 rule. Now, no 
more rules are applicable and the frame algorithm results t.he extended world constraint 
system W3. From W3 we can construct. the frame (W, r) with W = {wa, wd, and r 
consists of fa = fb = {(wa, wa), (wu, wd, (WI, wd}· Each world Wi consists of the 
A£Cx:;-axioms which are labelled with 10,. • 
We will now show that the frame algorithm has the following two important proper-
ties. Firstly, it terminates with a world constraint system ~v as input which is inducecl 
by a finite set FI, . .. ,Fn of A£Cx:;-axioms. Secondly, the resu lt of the frame algorithm 
with input W is 54-satisfiable iff the set FI , . .. ,Fn of A£C}C-axioms is 54-satisfiable. 
Theorem 3 .4 If W is a world conshY/.int syste'J7), which is inri'll,ced by a finite set of 
ACCx:; -axioms, the fmme algordhm te7'1n.inates with input HI. 
Proof: Let W be induced by the A£C}C-axioms FI , ... , F7/.' The main idea is that only 
a finite number of new labels are introduced to HI by the frame algorithm. Therefore, 
let us firstly have a look at the labelled A£Cx:;-axioms which are added to 1!V by 
applications of the propagation rules. 
1. An application of the --+ 0 rule to DiF II W adds the labelled A£Cx:;-axiom F " W 
to W. Thereby, the left hancl side F of F " W is a su bformula of the left hand 
side DiF of DiF " w, to which the --+0 rule has been applied. 
2. An application of the --+0 rule to 0 iF II W adds the labelled A.cC}C-axioms 
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to W, if DiG l II tv, ... , DiGm II w arf' exact.ly t.hC' world constraints of the form 
DiGlltv in Wand v is a new labf'l. Again, each left hand sidf' ofthe added labelled 
A.L:C,caxioms is a (sub )formu la of t.he If'ft hand side of one of t.he la lwlled A.L:CA:;-
axioms 0 i F II tv, DiG l II tv, ... , DiGm II w to which t Il<" --t o rule has been applied. 
3. The --to rule does not add new labelled A£CK-axioll1s to W at. a.ll. 
Thus, since the frame algorithm starts wit.h a. world const.raint syst.em ltV which is 
given by {Fl II tvo,·· · , Fn II tvu}, it only a.dds labelled A£CK-axiollls F II tv to W where 
F is a (sub)formula of one of t.he A£CK-axioms F\, ... , F" . Let ItOW S bf' t he set of 
all possible sets consisting of (sllb)forlllll las of FI , ... , F, .. Obviollsly, S is finite since 
{Fl , ... , Fn} is finite . 
This consideration in mind, it. is ('<IS), \.0 \'('rify (.hilt. (.11<' --t o rule ca.n l)f' app li ed to 
W only a finite number of timf's: If t.ll<' --t o rill e is ilppli('d (.0 a labelled A£CK-axiom 
0 i F II tv, and DiG! II tv , ... , DiG", II W ilH' ('xaeLly LlI(' world cOll st ra int.s o f thC' form 
DiG II tv in W, then { 0i F,D;C~'I'" .,D/,'.",} is ;111 ('1(,IIWII\. of S. The app li cat.io ll of 
--to then extends W by {F II 11,(,'111 u, D;(,'1 II tI, .. ',(,'/11 II u,D,(,'", II v} wlwrC'v is a 
new label. Thus, given an arbit.rary led)!'l Ii!, the --t o rule call 110 11Iore be a.pp lied to 
0 i F II iV if DiG l II iV, . . . , DiGm II zi! a.re exact ly (.he world cOlls(.raint.s ill Waf t.he form 
DiG II w since tV is now coverf'd by v. Summing up, (.0 ('aell sct. ill S the --t o rule can 
be applied at most once. ThLls, t.his rule call be' <lpplie'd Oldy a. (illite n1l1l1bC'r of tinlC's, 
i.e., the frame a lgorithm can only add it finit.e nUllIlwr of IWW labels (,0 HI . 
Obviously, given a fixed label w in IV , the --to nIl(' call ol Ily 1)(' app li (~d a finite 
number of times. This is the case because !.Ite labell ed A£CK-axiol1l wllich is add('d to 
W by this rule is syntactically shorter t.hall t. he l;tlwl l('e! A£C,,-axiom to which t he rule 
has been applied. Finally', t.he --t o nIl(' Ulil 1)(' app li('d t.o ('ac ll pa.ir (w,v) of labels in 
W at most once, and there1'orf' ol Ii y a fillit.(· Ilullllwr of t.illl(·s. 0 
Thus, the application of t. lw fr<l.ll)(, a. lgorit.hm to it. world cOllstra.illt. system W in-
duced by the A.L:CA:;-axioms Fl , ... , F" termillates a ile! resu lt.s a world ('ollst.raint system, 
say W'. To test S'4-satisfiability of W', for ea.cl l lab(· l Hi ill W' we compute the set of 
all those A.L:CA:;-axiol11s in llV' which are label led by tv and which do not contain any 
indexed 0 or 0 operator. That l11("anS , sllch a sd. cOIlt.a.ins on ly A.L:C-axiorns and is 
therefore called the A.L:C test sct of toDd w. l'dore fonnel!ly , if W is a world constraint 
system, the A.L:C test se t A( w) of label w ill W is given by Lite set 
{F I F II tv E lV, and F doC's not contain allY modality}. 
We are now going to show that a set F I , ... , F" of A.L:CK-a.xioms is 5'4-satisfiab le iff the 
A.L:C test set A( tv) of each la.bel tv in W' is satisfiab le. Thereby, W' is the result of the 
frame algorithm with input {Fl II tuu,···, F" II tvo} . Wf' will firstly prove the following 
two lemmata. 
1.5 
Lemma 3.5 Let W be a wodd constraint system which is induced by A.cC}C-axioms 
F1 , ... , Fn , and let W' be the result of the frame algorithm, with input W. fr J( = 
(W, r, J(I) is an 54 J(ripke st7'ucture which satisfies HI, then for each label w in W' 
there is a world wI{ E W such that J(, wI{ 1= F for each labelled A.cC}C -axiom F II w 
in W'. 
Proof: If W' is the result of the frame algorithm with input HI there is a chain W = 
Wo -t} W} -t} ... -tk Wk = W' with -tjE {-to, -to, -to} for i E {I, ... , k}. We will 
now show that J( satisfies each labelled axiom in W' by ind uction over the number of 
rule applications. By assumption, J( = (W, r, ]{I) satisfies H/o = {F11Iwo,.·., Fnllwo}, 
. h· ld I{. W 1 1· }" I{ IF!" !\. I F l.e., t ere IS awor Wo In SUC1 tlat \,10 0 = }, ... , \ ,100 = n. 
We thus can assume that, after j rule applications, for each label w in W j there is 
a world w K in W such that J(, wI\" 1= F for each labelled A.cC,,-a.xiom F II Hi in Wj. If 
Wj -tj Wj+1 there are three possibilities. Firstly, suppose H~j -to ~j+l. Then there 
is a labelled A.cC}C-axiom O J F II 10 in IV j , and H~j+ 1 = Wj U {F II w}. By ind udion 
hypothesis, J(, wI{ 1= DiF for some world w!i." in W. Because of property (PI) of 
54 Kripke structures, therefore 1{, w!\' F F II w holds. That means, J( sat.isfies each 
labelled A.cC}C-axiom in ~j+ 1. 
Secondly, suppose Wj -to l~j+I . · In this case, there are labelled A.cC}C-axioms 
0 j F II W, DiG1 II w, ... , DjGm II w in Wj, and 
where v is a new label. By induct ion hypothesis, there is a world wJ\ in W such that 
(i) J(,wI{ 1= 0 i F and (ii) J(,w 1\ 1= DjGj for j = 1, ... ,m. Because of (i) there is 
a world vI( in W (not neccessarily different from w !\') snch that (w!\, v!\' ) E Ij and 
J(, v K 1= F. Furthermore, because of (ii) and property (P2) of 84 I\ripke structures, 
both J(, wI{ 1= DjGj and J(, wK 1= DjD;Gj holds for j = 1, ... , TIL And thus, sin ce 
(.wK , vK ) E Ii, especially ]{, vI( F G,j and 1{, vK F DjG,j holds for j = 1, ... , m. That 
means, J( satisfies each labelled A.cC}C-axiom in W i+1 . 
Finally, if ~i -to ~i+l' there is nothing to show since the -to rule does not 
introduce new labelled A.cC}C-axioms to Wi. D 
The next lemma states that a world const.raint lV', which is the result of the frame 
algorithm, is 54-satisfiable if the A.cC test set of each lab el in TIl/' is satisfiable. 
Lemma 3.6 Let W be a wodeL COT/,straint syste-m which is inrill,cul by a Fnite set of 
A.cC}C-axioms, and let W' be the rcslllt of the frame algo'rithm with input IV. fr the 
A.cC test set A( w) of each label w in W' is satisFablt:, then j,'V is S'4-sat.isFable. 
Proof: Let J( be the Kripke structure (W, r,I{J) with 
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• W is given by the set of all labels i 11 WI. 
• r consists of one accessib ili ty relation "Ii for <"ach ag<"llt i. Thereby, "Ii is given by 
the reflexive and transitive closure of the set. {(w,v) 1 HI lXl i 11 in l¥}. 
• f{ [ is given such that A' , HI 1= ]. for ea.ch labe ll ed A£CK-axiol11 F II w in W' where 
F does not contain any indexed ° or 0 operat.or. 2 
Obviously, f{ is an S4 Kripke struct.ure, sillce each accessib ili t.y rda.t.ion is rdlexive and 
transitive. We will now show that X sat.isfies each world const.raint c in ~V'. If c is of 
the form w lXl i v there is nothing to show l)('callse or t.he definit.ion of A'. 
The fact f{ 1= F " w for each lalJ<"i1ed A£CK-axiol1l F " HI in W' can be shown by 
induction over the number of modalities ill F. Ir F docs not. contail) any modalities, 
then f{, w 1= F because of til<" co nst.rllct.ion of !\' . Thus \\'(' call assul11e' t.llat. l\', w F= F 
for each labelled A£Cc axiol11 F' " w ill lV' si lch 111 ("11, F COllt.ilillS /I 1ll0dalit.iC's. 
If F contains n + 1 modali t. i('s , 1.11<')'(' arc 1,\\'0 possil)ilit.i('s: t.Il<' lea.d in g opC'rat.or is 
either oi or Oi. Firstly, suppose lV' con (.;.1 ins a world const.raint. oJi' II w , wlwre F has 
n modalities. We then haY<" to show t.ha.t. }\', llJ 1= O, /<" i.e., t.Ilat. f\',v 1= F for each v 
such that (w, v) E Ii . If HI = 11, the'n !\', v F= F lH'CClus(' F" 'U! is ill W' if D,F " w is 
in W' (by an application of the -to rule), <Il lel F cOllt.aills only /I llloelalilips. If w # 11 
and (w, v) E Ii, then, bee-a.u::;f' of t.lle defillitioll of , ',:, t.II('I'(' is <I, /la.t.1I 
in WI. That means, during the frCllll<' algorithm world cO ll sl,ri'lill1, systems ]lVil ,··· , Wik 
have been constructed such that tile world const.raillt. 'Wi} 1Xl; 'IlJi)+1 is int.roduced to ~V' 
by Wi) -til vVi)+J with -til E {-t o , -to} for 1 :S j :S k - l. 
It is easy to verify that after app lyi ng -til to Wil no furt.her labpllf'd A£CK-axiorns 
with label WiJ (= tv) are added to t.he world const.raint, SySklll : T lw -to rule has a.lready 
been applied as often as possible, the -to rule only introdll ces labelkd A£CK-axioms 
with a new label, and the -to rulf' doC's not int.rodll cf' new labell ed A£CK-axioms at 
all. By assumption, we know oiF" w is ill WI, Clnd tllercforf' oiF II w is in !¥i l . Thus, 
by definition of the -to and the -t o rule, bot.h o iF IIwi2 anel F " Wi 2 are in Wi 2 . 
Analogously, Wi. contains O,F " 'W i .. ami F " Hiik, sllciI t.iIat F " 11 E W' sincf' 1Uik = v 
and Wik ~ l¥'. By inductioll hypot.llC'sis we kilO\\, }\', (I 1= F lwccwse F cont.a.ins on ly 
n modalities. 
Suppose now W' contains OiF' II w. We t.hen have t.o show that ]{ 1= F" v for some 
world v such that (w, v) E "Ii . If OiF" w is in WI, t.hell the world constraints F" v and 
2Note that such a X-interpretat.ion 1\'/ exist.s, s ill ce w(~ ass llllled UI(~ ALC t.(~st. set of each labe l in 
W' to be satisfiable. Given interpet.ations II " . , , In which sat.isfy Ule ALC t.est, set.s of each labe l in 
W' respectively, the construction of f{/ is st.raig ittJorward. 
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1. Let W be the world constraint system which is induced by F1 , . .. ,Pn . 
2. Let W ' be the result of the frame algorithm with input lV. 
3. For eaGh label w in W ' do: If the A £C test set of tv is not satisfiable, then 
STOP and return "54-unsatisfiable". 
4. Return "54-satisfiable". 
Figure 3: The S4-satisfiability algorithm. 
w [Xli v are in W' because either the --+0 or the --+0 rule has been applied to F "tv. By 
construction of Ii we then know (tv,v) E Ii, and thus A' 1= F II v follow s by induction 
hypothesis . 0 
The following theorem summarizes the previous results. 
Theorem 3.7 Let FI , ... , Fn be a .finite set of A£CK-a:n:o ms , and let IV be the wodd 
constraint system which is induced by FI , . .. , Fn. fr w' is th e result of the frame 
algorithm with input W, then th e set FI , . .. ,Fn is 5'4 -sal.is.fi"aule iff th e A£C test set 
A( w) of each label w in W' is satis.fiable. 
Proof: By definition, the set F1 , . .. ,Fn of A£C}C-ax ioms is 54-satisfiable ifF lV is 54-
satisfiable. Firstly, suppose J( is an 5'4 Kripke structure which satisfies W. Then, 
because of Lemma 3.5, for each label w in IV' there is a world w T" E W such that 
I<, w 1= F for each A £C}C-axiom F II tv in lV'. 1 bus, especially the A£C test set of 
each label w in W ' is satisfied by J(. Conversely, suppose that the A£C test set A( tv) 
of each label w in W ' is satisfiable. Then HI is 5'4-satisfiable because of Lemma 3.6 . 0 
Thus, we obtain the algorithm for testing 5'4-sat. isfiabilit.y of a. set FI , ... , Fn of 
A£C}C-axioms which is given in Figure 3. An algorithm for testing satisfiabi lity of 
A £ C test sets will be given in the next section. 
4 Testing Satisfiability of ALe Test Sets 
In this section we will show how to test satisfiability of a given A£C test set A( w) . 
We procedd as follows . Firstly, we will show that satisfiability of A( w) is equivalent 
to the problem whether there exists an interpretation I such that I satisfies a given 
A£C-ABox A and such that Db = 6,1 for a given concept Do. This test will be called 
top consistency test. In Subsection 4.1 we will prove this equivalence, show how to 
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construct A and Do from A( w), and give an algorithm for deciding top consistency. In 
Subsection 4.2 we will show that this algorit.hm terminates and that it ·rs sound and 
complete. 
4 .1 Testing Top Consistency 
An ACC test set A( w) consists of a finite number of ACC.I(-axioms without any indexed 
modalities, i.e., of terminological and assertional axioms of the form 
G=D,G=JD 
a: G 
aRb 
(negated) concept equivalence 
concept instance 
role instance 
only, where G, D are concepts , R is a role, and a, b are objects. 
As a result of the previous section, S'4-satisfiability of a set of ACC.I(-axioms can be 
reduced to satisfiability tests of a number of ALC test sets (d. Theorem 3.7). Observe 
that the concept instances and the role inst.ances in an ALC test set A( w) define an 
ACC-ABox. That means, testing satisfiahility of an ALC test set is equivalent to testing 
satisfiability of an ACC-ABox together with a set. of (negated) concept equivalences. 
The next theorem states that this test can be performed by an algorithm which checks 
top consistency of a single concept w.r.t. an ALC-.i-\13ox. YAle say a concept C is top 
consistent w.r.t. an ACC-ABo:/: A ifF there exists an int.erpretat. ion 1 sllch that 1 FA 
and G is interpreted as the top concept, i.e., GI = T'. 
Theorem 4.1 Let A be an ACC-ABo.?: and let Gi , Di , E i, Fi be concepts. Th e1'e e.?:ists 
an interpretation which satisfies A } C1 = D1,·· · , Cn = D n } and E1 =J F1,·· ., Em =J Fm 
iff the concept ((G1 n Dd U (-,G1 n -,Dd) n ... n ((Cn n Dn) U (-,Cn n -,Dn)) is top 
consistent w. r.t. Au {a1 : (E1 n -'.F~) U (-,E1 n Fd, ... , (/,m : (Em n -,Frn) U (-,Ern n Fm)}. 
Proof: Firstly, let 1 be an interpretation which satisfies A, C\ = Di , and Ei =J Fi 
(i = 1, . .. ,n,j = 1, ... ,m) . Since 1 satisfies Ei =J Fi t.here exists an element d.i E t::,I 
such that dj E [Ei n -,-fiF or d.i E [-,E j n FijI. Let now l' be the interpretation which 
extends 1 as follows: for each of the elements d.i (j = 1, . .. , m) a new element d~i is 
added to the universe t::, I of 1. Then, each of these new elements dj is interpreted 
by l' exactly as di is interpreted by 1.3 More formally, t::,I' := t::,I U {d~, . .. , d~} 
where dj is a new element . Furthermore, each atomic concept A is interpreted by 
AI' := AI U {d~i I d.i E AI}, each role R is int.erpreted by R1' := RI U {( d'i' d) I (d.i , d) E 
3Note that this can be done only in concept languages which are not ex pressive enough to state 
that a given concept contains a t most 11 elements (n > 0) . It. is easy t.o verify tha.t A.ce sa.tisfies this 
condition. 
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RI}U{(d,dj) I (d,d.i ) E RI}, each object. u ill A is int.erpret.ed by 0 1':= 01, and, finally, 
the new objects aI, ... , am are interpret.ed by (/,f = d';. Note t.hat l' is defined in such 
a way that we can guarantee unique llame int.erpret.atioll of each object the ABox in 
A U {at: (El n ,Fd u (,E1 n F1)"'" am : (Em n ,l?'n) U (,Em n Fm)}. 
It is easy to verify that l' satisfies A. Furt.hermore, l' sat.isfies ai : (Ein,Fi )U( ,Ejn 
Fj ) for j = 1, ... ,m since dj is in [Ein'FiV' or in [,EinFil /' iff eli is in [Ein,Fi]f or 
in [,Ej nFj]f. Analogously, l' satisfies the concept (,quivalcnces Gi = Di since they are 
satisfied by I. That means, for each element d E !).I' eit.her d is in e l ' and in DI', or d is 
in [,CF' and in [,DV'. Thus, l' satisfies [(CinD;)U(,Cin,Dd]f =!).I for i = 1, ... ,11.. 
And thus l' interprets ((C1 n Dd u (,G1 n 'Dd) n ... n ((c" n Dn) U (,en n ,D,,)) 
as !).I'. 
Conversely, suppose I sat.isfies Au {(/,1 : (EI n ,PI) u (, EI n F I), ... , (I", : (Em. n 
,Fm) U (,Em n Fm)} and I interprets ((C\ n D1) u ('(,'1 n , J)I)) n ... n ((Cn n D,,) u 
(,Cn n ,Dn)) as !). I. Since I sC\.tisfi(~s ai : (Ei n ,Fj ) U (,Ei n Fil, obviously Ei =I Fi 
is satisfied by I for j = 1, ... , '/11. Purt.itl'rl1I0rc\ si IIC<' [( (,'j n JJ j ) U (,Ci n ,D;) F = !). I, 
each element dE !).I is in C I iff" d is ill DI. Tha.t. 11l<'iIIIS , I sat.isfies Ci = D i . 0 
Thus, for testing satisfiability of all ALC test set. A( w) WI' IJ('('d an algorit.hm which 
tests top consistency of a concept Du \\' . r.( .. all ALC-ABox A. Wc will now give such an 
algorithm which is based on tiIe not.ioll of a (COIIC<'Pt.) cOllst.raillt syst.(~nl. A consln/.int 
system is a finite non-empty set of cOllst.raints a : C or (/,Hh, whe!'(~ C is a concept, R 
is role, and a, b are objects. A COllst.raillt. SystClll S' cOllt.aills <I. clash iff (i) S contains 
two concept instances of the form (/, : JI and (/, : ,JI \\'ll(~r<' (/, is all objf'ct and A is an 
atomic concept or (ii) S contains a. cOllstraint (/, : ~ for SOIlJ(' obj(~ct. a. We say S is 
clash-free iff S does not cont.ain a clash. A const.raillt syst.elll S is satisfiable iff there 
exists an interpretation I such t.hat. ] 1= oS for each COllstril.illl. s in S. 
Given an A.cC-ABox A and a cOllcept Du, we say tile cOllstraint. system S is induced 
by A and Do iff S = Au {(/,o : D~ , (/,1 : D
'O , .. . , an : Do} \\'hf're (/, 0 is a new object, D 'O 
is the negation normal form of Du, and (/'1, ... , (/,n are cxactly the objects in A . 
The top consistency a.lgordhm. has all A.cC-AI3ox A amI a. concept Du as input. The 
algorithm starts with a constraint syst.e\l1 S which is induc('d by an A.cC-ABox A and 
a concept Do, and successively adds lie\\, cOllstraint.s t.o S' by the five propagation rules 
defined in Figure 4. Thereby, it works as follows. Let. Su bf' til<' cO llst.raint system which 
is induced by A and Do. If there exists a cllain Su ~l 8 1 ~2 ... ~n Sn such t.hat 
(i) each ~i is the first rule is the sequellce --7n, --7U, --7,</, --73 1 , --732 which is applicable 
to Si and (ii) Sn is complete and clash-free, then ret.urn " t.op consist.ent." else return 
"not top consistent". A constraint system S is called complete iff 110 propagation rule 
is applicable to 8. 
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1. 5-n {a:C1 ,a:C2 } U 5 
if a : C1 n C2 is in 5 
and 5 does not contain both constraints a : C1 and a : C2 . 
.> 
2. 5 -u {a : D} U 5 
if a : C1 U C2 is in 5, 
neither a : C1 nor a : C2 is in 5, and D is either C1 or C2 . 
3. 5-v {b: C} U 5 
if a : V R.C and aRb are in 5 
and b : C is not in 5. 
4. 5 -31 {aRb,b: C, b: Do} U 8 
if a : "3 R. C is in 5, 
D1 , . . . ,Dn are exactly the concepts occuring in con::;traints of the form 
a : V R.Di in S, there exists no c such that c: C, c : D1 , . .. , c : D" , c : 
Do are all in 5, and b is a new object. 
5. 5 -32 {aRc} u S 
if a : "3 R. C is in S, 
D 1 , . .. ,Dn are exactly the concepts occuring in constraints of the form 
a : V R.Di in 8, and for some c the constraints c : C, c : D1 , .. • , c : 
Dn , c : Do are all in S and aRc is not in 8. 
Figure 4: Propagation rules of the top consistency test. 
4.2 Properties of the Top Consistency Algorithm 
In this subsection we will show that the top cons i::;tency algorithm is sound, complete, 
and terminates. Tha.t means, if we apply this algorithm to an AIC-A Box A and 
a concept Do, the algorithm terminates and returns "top consistent" . iff Do is top 
consistent w.r. t . A. 
Thus, if 5 is the constraint syst.em which is induced by A and Do we firstly show: 
Each chain of rule applications starting with S whi ch can be const.ructed by the top 
consistency algorithm is finite. Note, that the top con::;istency algorithm may construct 
more than one such chain if S contains concept disjunctions, e.g., a: C UD. 
Lemma 4.2 Let S be a constraint system which is induced by an AIC-ABo:r A and 
a concept Do. Th en the top consistency algorithm cannot constnlct an in.fi:nite chain 
S = So -1 Sl -2 ... with -iE {-n, -u, -v, -31 , -32 }· 
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Proof: Firstly, we show that thf' -t3) rule can be appliC'c1 \.0 5' oldy a finitp. number 
of times. It is easy to verify that, if I! : C is acldf'd \.0 Si by a propagation rule, the 
concept C is a (sub )concept of the concepts occurring ill Suo Let P be the set of all 
possible sets of concepts which can bp. built up from (sub )concepts in Suo Obviollsly, 
P is finite. 
Suppose now, in some 8 j the -t3) rule is appliC'd t.o (I, const.rain(. a : 3 R.C, where 
Dl' ... ' Dn are exactly the concepts in the const.ra,illt,s of the form (/. : V R.D} in Sj. 
Then 8 j is extendp.cl by aRb, h : C, I! : D~ \\'het'(" I! is a nC'w object. Fur(.hermore, 
before we can apply the -t3) rule again, the -tv rlile lIas (.0 be applied to aRI! and 
a : V R.D 1, ... , a : V R..DIl' re~q)f'ctivcly. Thereby, t.he cOlls(.ra,int,s h : D I, ... , h : Dn are 
added. That means, we will obt.ain a const.raint SYS(.('I11, sa.y Sj (j > 'i), whicll contail1s 
at least the constraints I!: C,I!: D~,I!: DI, ... ,I!: /)'" wller(' {C:,D~,/)" ... ,Dn} is 
an element in P. Suppose now, t.h(')'(' is a cOlls\.raild, of (,11<' form (/.' : 3 W.C in somf' 
constraint system Sk, k ~ j, where (/.' is all a.rbit.rary ohj('c(. a,lld H' is all arbi(.ra,ry role. 
Furthermore, let D l , . .. , Dn l)f' tlw concepts ill t.h(' cOlls\.raints of t.h(' forlll (/.' : V Rl.D} 
in 8k . In this case, the -t3) rule is not a,pplicablc (.0 S'/.: (1)('('a,lIs(' of it.s precondit.ion). 
The reason for this is due to the fact t.hat t.hcr(' is already an object, 1l<lIlH'ly Ii, in 51.: 
such that the constraints I! : C, I! : D
" 
... ,h : D"" II : j)~ are all in 51.: . In t.his casp. only 
the -t32 can eventually be applipd t.o a': 3R'.C, addillg a'HI! t.o ,c.'I.:. TilliS, sincf' P is 
finite, the -t3) is applicable only a fillit.C' 1111111I)('r of (.illl<'s. 
As an immediate conseqUf'IICe, Oldy it fillik 1l11111lwr of Ilew objects arC' addp.d to 
8 because none of the ot.iIf'r propa.gat.ion nIl('s illt.ro<illC<'S Ilew object.s (.0 a constraint 
system. Thus, each Sj cOllt.ains Oldy a, fillite nlll11lwr of oiJje('\.s sillcf' t.11<' Illlllllwr of 
objects in 80 is finite. With this, it is ('asy t.o verify t.hrlt. t.lw ITlllilining nIlcs -tn, -tu , 
-tv, and -t32 can be applied only a fillit.e llu1l11wr of t.i1l\(~s: '1'll('s(' rules are applied to 
a: C1 n C2 , a: C1 U C2 , a: V n..C, alld (/. : 3 R.C, respectively, a,lld add strictly shorter 
constraints to 8 than the constraint. they have bcC'n applied (.0. Tllcreby, a is an object 
in Sand C l , C2 , V KG, and 3 n..C are (sub)forllllliris of collcepts ill So. Furt.hermore, 
the -tn (-tu) rule can be applied to cach cOllstraint. of the form a : C't n C2 (a : C1 U C2 ) 
only once. The -tv rule ca.n be applied t.o tile pa.ir (/ : V H. C alld aRI! only once. And, 
finally, the -t32 rule can be applied to cacit pair (a, I!) of oi.>jccts ill S' a.t. 1ll0St. once. 0 
To prove soundness and complf'tf'llesS of tile top consist.ellcy algorithm, we introduce 
the following important lemma. 
Len1ma 4.3 Each complete and clash-frer:. consfrain!. s'!p;/r;1n is srdis.fiablr:.. 
Proof: Let S be a complete and clasit-free constr<l.int syst.em, and let I be an interpre-
tation such that 
• ~I is the set of objects in S. 
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• AI := {a 1 a : A is in S} for each atomic concept. A in 8 
• RI := {(a, b) 1 aRb is in S} for each role R in 8 
• aI := a E ~I for each object a in S 
We will now show that I 1= s for each constraint s in S: If s is of the form aRb 
then I 1= s by definition of I. 
If s is of the form a : C, then I 1= s can be shown by induction over the structure of 
C: If C is an atomic concept, then I Fa: C because of the definition of I. If C = T 
then I Fa: C because of T I = 6/, and C cannot be 1.. since 8 is clash-free. For the 
induction step we have to show that I Fa : C if a : C is in S, and C is of the form 
,Cl, CI n C2 , CI U C2 , V R.C1 or "3 R.G1. 
Firstly, let C be of the form ,CI . Since we assumed the input of the top consis-
tency algorithm to be in negation normal form, and none of the five propagation rules 
introduces concepts which are not in negation normal form, C1 is an atomic concept. 
Furthermore, since S is clash-free, a : C\ is not in 8. Therefore I ~ a : C1 and thus 
I Fa: ,CI . 
If C is of the form C1 n C2 ((,\ U C 2 ) we know a : C\ and (or) a : C2 to be in 
S because S is complete. In this case, by induction Ilypothesis, I 1= (J. : C1 and (or) 
I Fa: c2 . Thus, the induction step is t.rivial. 
Let now C be of the form "3 R. C1. Since 8 is complete neither the ---+3] nor the 
---+32 rule is applicable to S. Therefore, one of these rules has already been applied to 
a : "3 R.C1, i.e., aRb and b : CI are in S for some object h. By construction of I we 
know that I 1= aRb and, by induction hypothseis, I F b : C\. Thus, I 1= (J. : "3 R. C1. 
Finally, let C be of the form V R. C1. If there does not exist an object h in S such 
that aRb is in S, then (a I ,ll) rt. R[ for each element u E 6/, i.e., I Fa: V R.G1. Else, 
for each object b such that aRb is in 8, the ---+'<1 rule has been applied t.o (J. : V R. G1 
since S is complete. Thus, b : CI is in 8 if b is an arbitrary object such that aRb is in 
S. By induction hypothesis we obtain I F (J. : V R.Gj. 0 
We are now going to show tha.t the top consistency algorithm with A.cC-ABox A 
and concept Do as input results "top consistent" iff Do is top consistent w.r.t. A, i.e., 
iff there exists an interpretation I such that I 1= A and D6 = T J (= 6.1). To prove 
this, we introduce two lemmata which state: If we start with a constraint system So 
which is induced by an ALC-ABox and a concept, the top consistency algorithm can 
construct a chain So ---+1 Sl ---+2 . .. ---+n Sn such that Sn is complete and clash-free iff 
Do is top consistent. 
Lemma 4.4 Let A be an ALC-ABo:r, let Do be a concept, and let So be the constmint 
system which is induced by A and Do. If Do is top consistent w. T. t. A then the top 
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consistency aigo1'ithm can consh'u.ct a Fndf: chain S'u ---t I 5\ ---t2 ... ---t n S'n with ---tiE 
{---tn, ---tu , ---tV', ---t31 , ---t32} such that 5 n is cO'Inp lcl c and clash-frcc. 
Proof: We will show that there exists a cha in 8 0 ---t1 51 ---t2 ... ---t1l ,S"" where ---t j is the 
first rule in the sequence ---tn, ---tu , ---tV', ---t31' ---t32 'vvhich i~ applicable to 5 j , ~uch that 
(i) each 8 j is satisfiable (i = 0, . .. ,17,) a nd 
(ii) there is no more propagation rul e applicable t.o 5'". 
This will be done by inducti on over tile l1ulllb~r i of ruk application~. Since we 
assumed Do to be top cons istent w.r.t . A , there ex i~ ts an interpretat. ion I such t hat 
I F A and Db = 6/, i.e., there ex i~t~ an intc rpre t.a.t.i o ll I ~uch that I F .~ fo r each 
const raint s in S'o. Thus, we can (\'S~UJ1le that thcn' exist.~ a ll illt.('rprC'tat. ioll I,: which 
satisfies 8i . There are five possibilitie~ for S'i ---ti+l 8;+1: If t.IlP ---tn rul p is av pli cab le 
to 8i , let 8 j ---tn 8i+1 . Then I i+1 := I i obviously sat isri(' ~ S'i+ l. 
Else, if the ---tu rule is app li cable t.o (/. : C\ U C2 ill S" let S';+ I 1)(' S'i U {(/. Cd if 
I i Fa: C1 , and 8 i U {a: C2 } if I , IF (/.: C't . Again, 1;+ 1 := I i ~atisfi('s S'i+ I ' 
Else, if the ---tV' rul e is applicable t.o a : V n.. c: a lld aRI! in S';, let .c.,'; ---tV' 8 i+l . 
Then,.8i is extended by b : C. By indu ct ioll hy po t.lwsis we kllow t.hat I i 1= aRI! and 
I i Fa: V R.C. As an immediate cO llseqlwnce, I i+1 := I i satisfi('~ 5'i+I' 
Else, if the ---t31 rule is applicable to (/. : :lR.C in S'i , ldo S'i ---t3 1 8;+1. Thf'n, 8 i +1 
extends 8 i by the elem ents aRI!, I! : C, a nd I! : D~. Thc'reby, I! is a lI ew object. I3y 
induction hypothesis we know I i 1= a : :l R.C , i. e., the cxist.s a ll e lenw nt 71. E [ I I. such 
that RIi(aI·,u) and u E C l •. If I i +1 is ident ical with Ii but {/.+I := 7/" thus Ii+1 F aRh 
and I i +1 1= b : C. Furthermore, {/.+I = v. E [fl. = U I.+ I , i. e ., Ii+1 F I! : D~ since 
Db' = UI. and Do is equivalent. to its nega.t.ion 1I 0 rm a.l fo rm D~. 
Finally, if only the ---t32 rul e is a ppli cable to a : :3 fl. . c: ill S'j, let 8 i ---t32 8 i +1 . It. is 
easy to verify that after applying t.he ---t32 rule Ollce, no ot. her propagat ion rule will be 
applicable any more: The ---t32 rul e ext.f'ud s Si by aRI! wllC're I! is an object. occuring 
in 8i . Obviously, the only preco ndit.ion whi ch could be ~at.isfied as a consequence of 
adding aRb to 8 j is the precondition of t he ---tV' rul e whiclt- theoretica.lly- could extend 
the constraint system by b : C for some concept. C. I3ut. ~ince t.he ---t32 rule has been 
applied to 8 i , the constraint I! : C must be in S'i and t.hus the ---tV' rule cannot be 
applied. Thus, when applying ---t32 to (J. : :3 R.C a.1I information about objects b with 
aRb has been made explicit and is satisfied by I. Therefore, the interpretation I i+1 
which is identical to h but where in adi tion R I .+ 1 ((/1. , {/.) holds , sat isfies 5'i+ 1. 
Summing up, there exists a chain So ---t1 5'1 ---t2 ... ---t." 5'n, with 8 i ---ti+1 8 j+1 by 
the first propagation rule in the sequence ---tn, ---tu , ---tV', ---t31 , ---t32 which is applicable 
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to 5i , such that each 5 i is sat.isfiable. Because of Lemma 4.2, the t.op consist.ency 
algorithm cannot construct an infinite chain 50 ~1 S\ ~2 ... , such that we obtain a 
complete system 5n after n rule applications. Furtheremore, since S'n is sat.isfiable, 5n 
cannot contain a clash. 0 
Lemma 4 .5 Let A be an ALe -A Box, let Do be a concept, and let. 50 be the constraint 
system which is induced by A and Du . If lh e top consistency rtlgo·ril.h'l7l. can constnl.ct 
a chain 50 ~1 51 ~2 . . . ~n Sn with ~iE {~n , ~u, ~v, ~31' ~32} such that 5n is 
complete and clash-free, then Do is top consistent . 
Proof: Since 5n is comp lete and clash-free, 5n is satisfiable because of Lemma 4.3. 
In the proof of this lemma we eSI)f'cia.lly showed that the foll ow ing interpret.ation I 
satisfies 5n : 
• /:).1 is the set of objects in S". 
• AI := {a 1 a: A is in Sn} for f'ac h a.tom ic co ncept A in S". 
• RI := {(a , b) 1 aRb is in Sn} for f'ac h rol f' R in S". 
• a l := a E 6,,1 for each ob ject (/. in Sn. 
We still have to show that D6 = T'(= 6,,'), i. e., 'l/. E D6 for ea.c iJ element u E /:).1 . This 
is equivalent to I 1= a : D~ for each object (/. in S" because of t.he definition of /:).1, and 
because the negation normal form Do of Du is equiv(I,lent. t.o Du. 
If a occurs in 50, then a : Do is in Su by const.ruct.ion of t.he start const. raint system 
50 ' In this case I Fa : Do since I sa.t.isfies Sn and So ~ S/I' If, on the other hand , a 
does not occur in So then a has beell a.dded to S0111e constra.int. syst.em Si (0 :::; i < n) 
by the ~31 rule. This rule t.hen also has added (/. : Do to 5'i . Because of I F Sn and 
5 i ~ 5n in this case I 1= a : D~ holds. 0 
Summing up the results in this subsection we obtain the following theorem. 
Theorem 4.6 Let A be an ALe -A Eo.?: and let Du be a concept. Then the top consis-
tency algorithm with input A find Du t(:nninrdes find n :slllts «lop consistent" iff Do is 
top consistent w. r.t. A. 
Proof: Because of Lemma 4.2, t he top consi stency algorithm only constructs finite 
chains 50 ~1 S\ ~ .. . with ~iE {~n,~u,~v,~31 , ~32 }' Except from the ~u 
rule all propagation rules determine exactly one new constraint system. The ~u rule 
determines exactly two possible const ra in t systems, i.e ., there is only a finite number of 
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possible finite chains since So is finite. Thus, the top consistency algorithm terminates. 
Because of Lemmata 4.4 and 4.5 we know Do to be top consistent w.r.t. A iff there 
exists a chain So -1 ... -n Sn such that Sn is complete and clash-free. Exactly this 
is tested by the top consistency algorithm. 0 
5 Computing A Lex: Inferences 
Now we are going to show how to decide whether or not a given formula is a logical 
consequence from a set of A£CK-axioms. Therefore, we start with a set of A£CK-axiom 
which describe the actual world as well as the knowledge of agents. As implied by using 
the word "axiom", these formulas are assumed to be true under all circumstances. 
In contrast to this we now introduce the notion of A£CK-jonnulas which have the 
same syntax and semantics as A£CK-a.xioms but differ in the intuitive mea.ning: While 
A£CK-axioms will only be used to define an a.xioma.tiza.tion of a. world a.nd of agents' 
knowledge, some A£CK-formulas may be entailed by such a.n a.xiomatization while some 
others may not be entailed. That mea.ns, we need a. test whether an A£CK-formula is 
a logical consequence from a set of A£CK-axioms. 
We will show how to use the S4-satisfiability algorithm to test whether or not a 
given A£CK-formula is a logical consequence from a set FI , ... , Fn of A£CK-axioms. 
Again, we are only interested in S4 Kripke structures a.nd thus define: F is an S4 
consequence of FI , ... ,Fn iff for each S4 Kripke structure J{ = (W, r, J{ I) a.nd for each 
world w in W holds: if K, W F F I , ... ,Fn , then J{, W F F. 
Firstly, let F be an A£CK-formula of the form O~(C = D), O*(C =I D) , or O*(a : 
C), where 0* is an abbreviation for a possibly empty sequence of modalities. Then, 
F is an S4 consequence of FI , ... , Fn iff the set FI , ... , Fn, [-,P]* of A£CK-formulas is 
not S4-satisfiable, where [-,P]* denotes the negation normal form of -,P. Note, that 
-.:,p is an A£CK-formula if F is of the above described form. 
If, on the other hand, F is of the form O*(aRh), where 0" is an abbreviation for 
a possibly empty sequence of non-negated indexed 0 operators, we cannot use this 
test method since negation signs are not allowed in AL.:CK-formulas which contain a 
role instance. To handle this case, we extend the notion of A£CK-formulas as follows: 
if R is a role, a, b are objects, and i I , . .. ,im are agent.s, then O il' .. Oi", (aRb) is an 
A£C K-formula. 
Alternatively, these A£CK-formulas could be defined by oil ... 0i
m 
(aR'b) where (i) 
each 0iJ is either OiJ or -,0iJ , (ii) R' is either R or -,R, and (iii) the number of negation 
signs in Oil" . Oim (aR'b) is even. Using this definition it is easy to see that the negation 
I normal form of the new A£CK-formulas does not contain negation of roles. Therefore, 
on a technical level we could allow such formulas as AL.:CK-axioms in Section 2. But a 
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restriction like "the number of negat. ion signs is eW' Il " seems not. to Iw adf'quate when 
defining a language to describe knowledge of agcnt.s. However, for t.f'sting \\'hf'ther or 
not an A£C,cformula is entailed by a set FI , .. . ,Fn of A£C,c- a.xioms, this definition 
turns out to be reasonable. 
Note, that S4-satisfiability of a set of A£CK-formul as can 1)(" handled by the 84-
satisfiability algorithm in Section 3 even if we use the abo\'e introduced extended 
definition of A£C,cformulas: Firstly, the algorithm only treats the modalities of A£CK-
formulas, i.e., it works independently from the syntacti ca.l st ruct ure of formulas without 
modalities. Secondly, satisfiabi li ty of the res ulting A£C test set st.ill can be tested, since 
they do not contain negat ion of roles. And, finally, it does not matter whether aRb is in 
an A£C test set because of' O j l ... D.i.,,( aRh), or bccause of O il'" O;..,(aRh). Summing 
up, when using the extended definitioll o f A£CK- forlllulas we Il('ed 1l0t to challge the 
S4-satisfiability algorithm at a ll. 
The following lemma provides a. nice propert.y of A.cC,,·-fo rmul as a nd will be used 
in the proof theorem .5.2 . 
Lemma 5.1 Let FI , ... , Fn be an 5'4-solis/iabh' sd. of A£C,c-o .. l' ioms (Inri If'f R' be (I 
role which do es not occur in F I , ... ,F" . Then Ihr' .w:l F I , •. . , FI!' O il' .. 0 ;,,, (aR' h) of 
A£CK-form ulas is S 4-salisJiable fa/' f(I(·/t. SC q1U"1/ Cf' O il ... 0 i ,n of in.rh:l'frl 0 opcl'ato'rs 
and for each pa£1' (/', b oj ob.jects. 
Proof: Let W' be the result of the fram e a lgor ithm wit.h input FI , •.. , FII.' Since we 
supposed these A£CK-axioms to be 5'4 sat isfiab le, t. he A£C test set A( Hi) is sat isfiab le 
for each label tv in W'. Thus, es pecially tlw A£C t.est. set A(wu) of the real world Hio 
is satisfiable. 
Let us reconsider the 84 I\ripke st ructure f{ ill t.h e proof o f Lemma 3.6, i.e., 
• W is given by the set of all labels in W'. 
• r consists of one accessib ili ty relat. ion Ii for each agent i . Thereby, Ii is given by 
t he reflex ive and transitive closure of the set { (w,w' ) I Hi C><lj w' E W}. 
• J(I is given such that ]\', w 1= F for each labelled A£CK-formula F II tv 111 W' 
where F does not contain any modality. 
In the proof of Lemma 3.6 we have already shown that ](, tva 1= FI , ... ,Fn. Obviously, 
we can modify J(I such that ]{, tva 1= aR'b and ]{ , Wu F FI , ... , Fn. This is due to the 
fact that R' does not occur in FI , ... , Fn and thus does not occur in the A£C test set 
A(wo). Since (wo, wo) E Ii for each agent i, in this case ]{ , Wo 1= O il '" Oi",( aR'b). 0 
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Note, that this lemma does not hold for arbitril.ry I<ripke structures X:. For example, 
it may hold X:,W 1= Di(a : C), Di(a : --,C) if x: is a I<ripke structure such that there 
is no world accessible from w by agent i. But, obviously, x:, w IF Di(a : C),Di(a : 
--,C),Oi(aR'b). 
) 
For the following theorem we define syntactical operabons on sequences of indexed 
° operators. The 54 normal f01'm of Oil' .. D im is given by successively replacing each 
occurrance of a subsequence OJ ... OJ in Oil' .. Dim by OJ. For example, the 54 normal 
form of 04020203010101 is given by 0 4 0 2 0 3 0 1 , Conversely, an expanded version of 
a sequence Oil ' .. Dim is given by replacing one or more operators D.i by a sequence 
OJ ... OJ. Using these definitions, we say Oil'" Dim matches a sequence O.il ... Ojk iff 
° 11 ... ° jk is an expanded version of the 54 normal form of ° il ... D im ' For example, 
0 1 0 1 0 2 matches 0 10 2 and 0 10 20 2 , but it neither matches 0 10 20 3 nor 0 20 1 . 
Theorem 5.2 provides a test whether or not an A.cCx::-formula Oil'" Dim(aRh) IS 
entailed by a set of A.cCx::-axioms. 
Theorem 5.2 Let F1, ... ,Fn be an 54-satisfiable set of A.cCX::-fl3:iom.s and let F be 
an A.cCx::-formula of the form Oil'" Dim (aRb), whe1'e Oil ' .. Dim is a possibly empty 
sequence of indexed ° opemt01's. Then F is an 54 consequence of F1, ... ,Fn ~ff one of 
the Fj is of the form D.DM(aRb) whe1'e D. is a possibly empty sequence of indexed ° 
opemtors, and OM is a sequence of indexed ° opemtol's which 17udches Oil' .. Oim. 
Proof: Firstly, let F be of the form aRb. If one of the F.i is of the form D.(aRh), 
then K, w 1= aRb holds for each 54 I<ripke structure f{ with f{, w 1= F.i' This is an 
immediate consequence of property (PI) of 54 Kripke structures . 
Conversely, suppose that none of the F.i is of the form D.(aRb). Let vI! be the world 
constraint system {F1 II Wo,···, Fn II 1Oo} which is induced by F1, .. . , Fn and let W' be 
t.he result of the frame algorithm with input ltV. Since the set F1 , . .. , Fn of A.cCx::-
axioms is 54-satisfiable, the A.cC test set A( w) of each label w in W' is satisfiable. 
Furthermore, since none of the F.i is of the form D.(aRb), the A.cC test set A(1Oo) does 
not contain the formula aRb. It is easy to verify that in this case A( 100) is satisfiable 
by an interpretation I such that I IF aRb (e.g., by considering the propagation rules 
in [HoI90]). Let now K be the 84 I<ripke structure which is constructed from W' 
as in the proof of Lemma 3.6, but ]{/ is modified such that K, 'Wo IF aRh. Then, 
K, Wo 1= Fl, ... ,Fn but K, Wo IF aRb, i.e., aRb is not an 84 consequence of F1, ... , Fn. 
Suppose now, we want to test whether or not Oil'" Dim(aRb) is an 54 consequence 
of F1 , .•• , Fn- This is equivalent to testing whether or not F1 , ... , Fn , Oil'" Oim(a--,Rb) 
is 54-satisfiable. Since Oil' .. Oi", (a--,Rb) is not an A.cCJC-axiom, this case cannot be 
handled by the 54-satisfiability algorithm of Section 3. Alternatively, let us have a 
look at the application of the frame algorithm to the world constraint system W which 
is induced by {F1 , ... , Fn , Oil '" Oim{.a R'b)} where R' is a role which does not occur 
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in FI , ... , Fn. Because of Lemma 5. 1, FI , ... , F1I , O il'" Oi",( aR'b) is 84-satisfiable. 
Thus, this application of the frame a.lgorithm res ults a worlel co nstraint system "'V' 
such that the A£C test set A( w) is satsifiable for each label w in W' . Furth ermore, it 
is easy to verify that there is exactly olle la bel, say 1t), ill lV' such that A( 1V) contains 
the formula aR' b. 
Let us now consider R' as an abbreviation for -,R. Obviously, this does not influence 
the construction of W' but it may influence satisfiabilit.y of t.he A£C test set A(lU). As 
mentioned above, this test set A(1V) is unsat is fiabl e iff it contains aRb as well, i.e., iff 
aRb II w is in W' . It is easy to check that aRb 11 1v is in H/' iff okl ... ok:/ (aRh) II Wo is in 
W', whereby okl ... Ok/ matches 0'1'" O i", : Since O il'" O i",(a R'h)llwo is in W' , there 
are world constraints Wo !><lil WI, " " Wm-l !><lim W m (= 1V) in lV'. If Oil '" OJ,,, (aRb) Ilwo 
is in W' , then aRb II Wm is in ltV' because of the definiti on of the --t o and tlw --to rule. 
Replacing some operator Oil in Oil ' .. Dim by OJ) Oil does not infl u~ ll ce til(' ('x i sten c~ of 
aRb II w in VV' since oj}F II w is in W' if Oil OJ) F II w is in W'. This hol ds for a rbitrary 
formulas F and labels w because of t.ilf' --to rul e. Repl acillg a Sf'<[ uence OJ ... OJ 
} } 
in o jl ... o jm by OJ} doesn't influ e ll c~ t.he ex istcncf' of aRh Ilti) in IV ' as \ve ll, s ince, 
by definition of the --t o and the --to rule, if o j} F' II w is ill W' then o j) F II w' is in 
W' for each world w' s uch that thf' wor ld co nst.ra int.s w !><l;} W J , ... , Wp [Xli} w' are all 
in W'. In other words, if the world constra ints O il ... O i/,' II wand oi}F' 1110, and 
W [Xli} W I , ... , Wp [Xli} w' a re a ll in W' , thell F II w' is ill IV '. It. is e(\.sy to vf'rify that 
there are no other possibilities s li ch L\"d. uRI! II 'tv is ill IV ' . 
Finally, okl ... Ok/ (aRh) II 10u is in IV' ifF 0 )1(' o f t.he A£CK -forll1ul as Fi is of the form 
o.okl ... o k/(aRb), where o. is a poss ibly empty sequC'llce o f illdexed oo)('ral.ors. This 
follows immediately by the above a rgumentat ion a nd the definit.ion of the --to rule. 0 
Now we have given algorit.hms for (kciding 84-sat isfiability of a givell set of A£C,I(-
axioms, and, building upon this, for dec iding wheth er or not a given A£C,I(- formula F 
is an 84 consequ ence of a given set F1 , ••• ,Fn of A£C,I(-ax ioll1s. Le t. us finally prf'sent 
a possible application and a technical example. 
Example 5 .3 a) Suppose there are two shippings, '~1 a nd 82, which are cons idered as 
agents in the following . Both agents are compet itors and wa,Ilt to earn as mllch money 
as possible. Vie assume t hat there ex ist two transportation orders, 01 and 02. Thus, 
we need at least the following two A£C,I(-axioms to des crib e the world. 
(1) 01: trallsportation-order 
(2) 02: transportation-order. 
Both shippings know that transport.ation orders are orders t hey can carry out, called 
possible orders, and each agent knows t hat the other agent has this knowledge . This 
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is represented by 
(3) 0 SI (transportation-order ~ possible-order) 
(4) 0 S2 (transportation-order ~ possi ble-order) 
(5) 0SI OS2(transportation-order ~ possible-order) 
(6) 0S2 0 SI (transportation-order ~ possible-order). 
While both agents know that there is a transportation order 01, only S2 knows that 
there is still a second transportation order, namely 02: 
(7) OSI (01 : transportation-order) 
(8) OS2 (01 : transportation-order) 
(9) -'0SI (02 : transportation-order) 
(10) 0S2(02 : transportation-order) . 
Finally, we suppose that S1 knows that S2 knows 01 to be a possible order, while S2 
knows that Sl does not know that U2 is a possible order. This is represented by 
(ll) OSI 0S2(01 : possible-order) 
(12) 0S2 -'0SI (02 : possible-order). 
It is easy to verify that the set {(1), .. : ,(12)} of A£Cx:-axioms is 54-satisfiable. 
Provided that the agents can plan and reason on the basis of their knowledge, how 
do they act in the world? Let us firstly have a look at agent Sl. Obviously, he can 
conclude that 01 is an order he can carry out because of (3) and (7) or, alternatively, 
because of (ll). Analogously, he can conclude that also agent 82 knows 01 to be a 
possible order because of (ll). Since he cannot derive the existence of another possible 
order he will offer a low price for order 01. 
In the same way, agent 82 will conclude that both agents know 01 to be a possible 
order. But additionally, he knows that there is still a second possible order, namely 02, 
what can be derived from (4) and (10). Furthermore, he knows that agent 81 does not 
know 02 to be a possible order (because of (12)). Thus, he may act as follows: He will 
offer a high price for order 02 since he cannot derive the existence of another shipping 
which knows 02 to be a possible order. (Note that this can be risky, e.g., if there is 
another agent S3 and S2 does not know anything about the knowledge of agent S3). For 
order 01 he may offer a low or a medium price. 
Summing up, the behaviour of agents in the world is not only influenced by their 
knowledge about the world, but may be influenced by their knowledge about the knowl-
edge of other agents as well . 
b) Suppose the following two A£Cx:-axioms to be given: 
(FI) 0u(John: Vowns.-.ga..5oline-truck) 
(F2 ) Ou( truck-l : gasoline-truck) 
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Applying the frame algorithm to the world constraint system IV which is induced by 
FI , F2 and the A.cC}C-formula 
(F) O,,(John owns truck-l) 
we obtain the world constraint system \iV' which is given by 
D,,(John : Vowlls.-.ga.soline-truck) II Wu 
John: V ulvns. -.ga,soline-truck II Wu 
Da(truck-l : ga.soline-truck) II Wu 
truck-l : ga,soline-truck II Wu 
O,,(John owns (,ruck-l) II Wu 
Wu Mn w, 
John owns (,/'uck-l II w, 
Dn(John : VOII'ns.-.ga,soiille-(,ruck) II WI 
Joil)] : VOlI'lls.-.ga$olille-l.ruck II 'WI 
Dn( truck-l : gasoline-(,ruck) II w, 
truck-l : gaso/ine-(,rIlck II w, 
Obviously, the A.cC test set A( WI) is ul1satisfiable. That means, the A£CK-forl1Jula 
Da(John -.owns truck-l)' is an 54 consequence of FI and F2 . 
Note, that we have concluded agellL (J, Lo kllow t.ha.t .John does not OWIl t.ruck-I, 
though we cannot explicitely express an agents' kllowledge about negated roles when 
using the definition of A.cCK-axioms in Section 2. This conclusion becanw possible 
because of the above extended definition of A£CK-i'Ol'lllltla.s for computing A.cC}C-
inferences. • 
6 C o nclusion 
We have presented an extension of the concept language A£C by a knowledge operator 
D which is indexed by agents. This language can b(~ used to describe a real world 
by an A.cC-TBox and an AfC-ABox, i.e., by A£C}C-axioms without modalities. But 
additionally, it can be used to describe the knowledge agent i has about the world, 
about the knowledge of other agents, and about his own knowledge by A.cC}C-axioms 
with the leading operator D i . 
In this paper we used an axiomatization of the knowledge operator which has been 
proposed by Moore [MooSO, MooS5]. We have given an algorithm for deciding whether 
a set FI , . . . , Fn of AfC}C-axioms is 54-satisfiable. And, building upon this, we have 
shown how to test whether an AfCx::-formula F is an 5'4 consequence of FI , . .. , Fn. 
Both tests are of practical interest: The first one can be used to test consistency of the 
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represented knowledge, and the second one to find out whether a given A£C,cformula 
is implied by an agents' knowledge. An extension of our terminological representation 
system KRIS [BH91] with the knowledge operator 0 is under work. Note, that the 
presented algorithms cannot directly be used for an implementation. Of course, appro-
priate data structures and optimization techniques have to be developed for concre.te 
applications. 
Future work will mainly concern with two questions. Firstly, how to extend the 
present approach, e.g., by operators Ec.p (everyone knows c.p) and Cc.p (it is common 
knowledge that c.p). Secondly, an interesting task will be to catalogue multi agent 
applications by deciding what the general properties of knowledge in these applications 
are, and to devise algorithms to handle the resulting axiomatizations of the knowledge 
operator. 
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